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the impacts of giving allowances away for free to electricity local distribution companies (LDCs), the regulated entities that provide electricity to end users. This approach is a feature of H.R. 2454, accounting for 30 percent of allowances, with another 9 percent allocated to natural gas LDCs, and to a slightly lesser extent in S. 1733. Our results suggest this approach has implications for both the welfare costs of the policy and the distribution of impacts across households.
This extensive cap-and-trade literature is instructive in understanding the implications of various allocation provisions. However, the current bills in the U.S. Congress are far more complicated than the arrangements analyzed by existing studies. H.R. 2454 has over 20 provisions for allocating allowances. The bill has money flowing directly to industry, such as to domestic refineries and so-called "energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries". Money goes to consumers, via direct rebates for low-income households and via electricity and natural gas LDCs. Money is also targeted to support a variety of funds to address adaptation to climate change, including extensive technology development, renewable energy, energy efficiency measures, and some international programs. It is unclear how all this money will eventually make its way to households. Language in the bill is vague, for one thing, and even for those less ambiguous provisions, the degree of uncertainty in implementation and in market outcomes is substantial.
In this paper, we analyze the specific provisions of H.R. 2454 and attempt to determine how the various allocation schemes will flow through to households. We focus on 2016 as the year when all of the main provisions of the bill come into effect, and construct an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario for the LDC provisions and for the various energy efficiency and technology development provisions in the bill. These three sets of provisions account for approximately 43 percent of allowances in 2016, introducing a wide range of possible outcomes for the burden that households will face. Some of this uncertainty stems from the familiar uncertainty associated with technology development, but most of it arises from questions about how the policy would be implemented.
Additionally, we assume that government's own energy costs will increase, although no revenue is set aside in H.R. 2454 to pay for it. Without such an allocation, this increase in government costs would constitute a hidden tax, which we assume to be 14 percent of total allowance revenue based on estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (2009a). The magnitude of government costs changes with the allowance price, which varies across scenarios.
Our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are distinguished in the degree to which they affect allowance prices and the efficiency of the program. In the optimistic scenario, we assume LDC allocations end up reducing fixed charges on monthly electricity bills for some customers.
In contrast, in the pessimistic scenario, the LDC allocations reduce variable charges for all customers. The efficiency consequences under these scenarios depend on the degree to which the policy results in a weaker price signal to consumers. If consumers receive a weak price signal, there will be less of a behavioral change by end users of energy. This will lead to more emissions in this sector and will require greater emissions reductions from other sectors of the economy, which raises the allowance price and the overall cost of the program. Reducing fixed charges, as in our optimistic scenario, preserves the incentive features of pricing carbon and is thus more efficient.
Our pessimistic scenario also assumes the money spent on energy efficiency and technology development provisions is simply wasted, i.e., that no additional emissions reductions are obtained with the money dedicated to these efforts. In our optimistic case, we accept the opinion of some experts that society can benefit more from government investments in various energy efficiency and clean technology development programs than from the efforts of the private market (McKinsey and Company 2007) . Among the expected benefits would be additional reductions in CO 2 emissions, a diminished burden on other sectors of the economy, and lowered allowance prices. In addition, household electricity bills would be reduced as electricity consumption fell.
These two sets of extreme assumptions make a big difference in the costs of climate policy and in how those costs are distributed across households. We find that the net consumer surplus loss for an average household in 2016 is three times higher in our pessimistic scenario than in our optimistic one. Under the pessimistic assumptions, the average household incurs a net loss of $420; under optimistic assumptions, the loss is only $136. The CO 2 allowance price in the optimistic scenario is only $13.20/ton, while it is more than $10 higher, $23.43/ton, in the pessimistic scenario. The difference between these two cases is demonstrated by calculating Shapley values to show which of the optimistic assumptions are responsible for what portion of the cost savings to households (Roth 1988) . The allocation scheme in the H.R. 2454 bill is progressive over the bottom four-fifths of the income distribution under either set of assumptions. The average household in the lowest income quintile enjoys a net consumer surplus gain in both scenarios and households in the higher quintiles incur relatively more of the burden of the policy through the fourth quintile. The fifth quintile incurs a slightly smaller burden than the fourth as a percentage of income because of how some of the provisions pass through to shareholders, which are predominantly in the highest income quintile. This finding highlights some of the complicated ways in which the provisions impact households.
For comparison purposes, we also assess a simple allocation scheme in which 75 percent of allowances are auctioned and returned to households as a lump-sum payment per person, i.e., a so-called cap-and-dividend approach. 1 The average consumer surplus loss in this case is $206 and the allowance price is $17.37/ton, so the results lie in between our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for H.R. 2454. With no LDC allocation, there is no distortion in electricity markets in the cap-and-dividend scenario and this helps to reduce costs and the allowance price. On the other hand, with no allocation to energy efficiency and technology programs, there is no possibility of reaping those benefits that we obtained in our optimistic scenario. This is balanced against the possibility that the energy efficiency and technology programs might not benefit households, and the revenue might essentially be lost. The cap-and-dividend approach is progressive across the entire income distribution-the lump-sum return of revenue on a per capita basis benefits low and middle-income households relatively more.
Our results are not meant to be precise representations of the outcomes under proposed climate legislation. Rather, they are illustrative of the range of possibilities in a cap-and-trade program that has a complex, multi-faceted allocation scheme. Because of the uncertainty in how the separate provisions affect energy use, emissions, and household welfare, it is difficult to say exactly what the impacts of the legislation will be. Complex allocations and uncertain outcomes also make it difficult to protect certain vulnerable groups because allowance value and initial welfare losses remain undetermined. In contrast, a simple scheme such as embodied in the capand-dividend approach has more predictable and straightforward impacts on average burden and the distribution of that burden across income groups.
In the next section, we provide a review of the literature on the economic impacts of climate policy on households. We then describe our data and methodology, lay out the specific provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill, explain how we account for these provisions in our model, and present our results for both average consumer surplus losses and the distribution across quintiles.
Literature Review
Several studies have evaluated the impacts of alternative allocation schemes in a carbon cap-and-trade program. Dinan and Rogers (2002) find that distributional effects hinge crucially on whether allowances are initially distributed free of charge to incumbent emitters (grandfathered) or auctioned and whether revenues from allowance auctions, or from indirect taxation of allowance rents, are used to cut payroll or corporate taxes or to provide lump-sum transfers to households. They find grandfathering to be very regressive, as a result of the value flowing through to shareholders who are primarily in the upper-income groups. Parry (2004) also obtained this result in a calibrated analytical model. In contrast, Dinan and Rogers (2002) find that if allowances are auctioned, with revenues returned in equal lump-sum rebates for all households, then the regressivity finding is reversed. Using auction revenues to cut payroll or corporate taxes is found to be regressive, though less so than grandfathering.
Metcalf (2009) also analyzes reductions in payroll taxes. Specifically, he looks at a policy where revenues from a CO 2 tax are used to give each worker in a household a tax credit equal to the first $560 of payroll taxes; this would be equivalent to exempting from the payroll tax the first $3,660 of wages per worker. He finds that this option leads to approximately equal net impacts, as a percentage of income, across income quintiles. An option that couples this rebate with an adjustment to Social Security payments that benefits the lowest-income households makes the CO 2 policy more progressive. Finally, Metcalf compares these options to a lump-sum redistribution of the CO 2 tax revenues and finds that this last option is the most progressive of all. Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls (2009) assess the effects of a cap-and-trade program. They examine two cap-and dividend scenarios, one in which dividends are taxed and one in which they are not taxed. They also explore three other scenarios: reducing the payroll tax, reducing the personal income tax, and expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which is available for low-income households. The authors find that the cap-and-dividend options and the EITC alternative reverse the regressivity of carbon pricing. Reducing payroll or income taxes, however, exacerbates the regressivity. 2 Most of these studies use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), including direct energy expenditures as well as indirect expenditures through the purchase of goods and services. Most take a partial equilibrium approach, and focus on expenditures as a fraction of income. Some of the studies compare results using a measure of lifetime income, in addition to current income. The measure used in most studies as a proxy for lifetime income is consumption expenditures. Most consumption taxes, including CO 2 taxes or a cap-and-trade program, look more regressive on the basis of current income than on the basis of consumption. 3 We ignore the lifetime income issue in this study. Some of the studies compute consumer surplus losses rather than expenditures, using elasticities for various fuels and goods and services, but most simply focus on expenditures. Rausch et al. (2009) use a regionally disaggregated general equilibrium model to trace through the impacts of carbon pricing to changes in wages and returns on capital, issues that are ignored in the partial equilibrium studies. 4 The authors estimate the distributional impacts of a carbon pricing policy with seven alternatives for return of revenue to households: a lump-sum payment per household; uniform reductions in personal income tax rates, capital income taxes, or payroll taxes; a return in proportion to capital income; and two electricity scenarios, one in which revenue is returned in proportion to electricity consumption and one that provides a lump-sum payment. Results are generally similar to the partial equilibrium findings: lump-sum payments make for a progressive policy while reduction in personal income taxes, capital income taxes, or payroll taxes is regressive, with payroll tax reductions the least regressive of the three. A large literature in environmental economics has argued the efficiency merits of reductions in these kinds of taxes Goulder et al. 1999 ), but Rausch et al. (2009) find the efficiency gains to be relatively modest. The authors argue that this is likely a result of the revenue neutrality requirement in their model. They fix government revenue relative to GDP at the same level as in the no-policy scenario, which means that not all carbon pricing revenue is available for recycling purposes. In some cases, only about one-half of the revenue is available.
All of the above studies, with the exception of Rausch et al. (2009) , separate the distributional impacts from the efficiency costs of the cap-and-trade or carbon tax policy. Thus in each case, the price of carbon is the same across alternative allocation schemes. 5 The resource cost of the policy and the amount of allowance value created are also the same, and all that changes is the distribution of that value across sectors of the economy and households. Some allocation schemes affect the allowance price, however. The LDC allocation in H.R. 2454 is a case in point. If it leads to lower electricity prices than the prices in a full auction scenario, then it alters the costs of the program and the size of the allowance pie. Our earlier paper focused on this issue, arguing that reductions in variable electricity prices are a likely outcome. We then assessed the additional burden on society, and the distribution of that burden across income deciles and regions, compared with a full auction coupled with a per capita dividend of allowance value (Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2009) . We calculated that the net annual consumer surplus loss for an average household would be $157 higher under this approach than under capand-dividend. 6 However, we did not evaluate the full impacts of the LDC approach in the context of the entire H.R. 2454 allocation scheme-the exercise that is the focus of this paper. 7 Three government studies have analyzed the costs of H.R. 2454 to the U.S. economy, the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009a), the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2009b) , and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2009). These analyses differ from the aforementioned academic studies in that they analyze only the specific provisions detailed in the legislation. CBO (2009b) estimates the loss of purchasing power that households will experience in 2020 to be $160, or 0.2 percent of income, at projected 2010 income levels. The cost, however, varies greatly over household income levels. They estimate an average household in the lowest income quintile will see a net benefit of $125, or 0.7 percent of income, while an average household in the highest quintile will experience a cost of $165, or 0.1 percent of income. The middle-income quintile will incur the most significant cost of this policy, with an average cost of $310, or 0.6 percent of income, per household.
The CBO analysis allocates 31 percent of the total value of allowances to households, while businesses receive 44 percent of the value. The federal government and state and local governments receive 18 percent of allowance value, and the remaining 7 percent of allowance value is sent overseas to fund projects, such as reducing deforestation and adapting to climate change. Of the 31 percent allocated to households, 15 percent is given directly to households for low-income energy cost assistance, while the other 16 percent is given to electricity and natural gas local distribution companies to pass on to their residential customers. Of the 44 percent given to businesses, 29 percent is allocated to the same local distribution companies to pass on to their commercial and industrial customers, and it is then passed on to households in proportion to their holdings of equities. The remaining 15 percent given to businesses is directed to energyintensive, trade-exposed industries and passed on to consumers in the form of price decreases to offset the price increases in these industries induced by the cap-and-trade policy (CBO 2009b) .
EPA (2009) also estimates the cost of H.R.2454 to households. Rather than purchasing power, however, they estimate the average loss of consumption under the policy. Using their ADAGE computable general equilibrium model, they find an average household will incur a cost of $105 in 2020 (2005$) . This cost is equivalent to 0.11 percent of total household consumption in 2020. This analysis corresponds to the ADAGE model's allowance price in 2020 of $16 per metric ton CO 2 . EPA does not look at the distribution of costs across different income groups.
The EPA analysis allocates allowances in similar proportions to CBO, but the way in which they are distributed is different, because of their use of the ADAGE computable general equilibrium model. Allowances given to local distribution companies and trade-exposed industries, as well as many other recipients, are allocated within the general equilibrium model, so their distributional effects are subject to the equilibrium found within the model. For example, allowances allocated to electricity LDCs result in lower electricity prices for consumers, as opposed to a transfer to households as in the CBO analysis. Overall, 77.5 percent of the allowances are allocated in this way. The remaining 22.5 percent of allowance value, however, is allocated outside of the ADAGE model, and this value is given directly to households as a lumpsum transfer on a per-capita basis. These allocations to households incorporate allowance value given to programs such as low-income energy cost assistance and merchant coal generators.
EIA (2009) Like EPA, the EIA also does not calculate how this cost would be distributed among households of different income levels. The cost estimate corresponds to the NEMS allowance price in 2020 of $32 per metric ton CO 2 . The EIA also allocates allowances in the proportions specified by H.R. 2454, such as those given to LDCs and trade-exposed industries. They do not specify how this allowance value is then passed on to households and shareholders, either within the NEMS model or outside of the modeling framework.
Data and Methodology
We base our analysis on CES data from 2004 through 2006. The population sampled in the CES includes 97,519 observations for 39,839 households; an observation equals one household in one quarter. We use these observations to construct national after-tax income quintiles. Our sample for examining regional effects includes 79,976 observations for 34,437 households in 43 states plus the District of Columbia. 8 We aggregate the observations into 11 regions. Although we do not use observations with missing state identifiers in our regional-level calculations, we do include them in our calculations at the national level.
We account for direct energy expenditures and indirect expenditures through the purchase of goods and services. 9 We focus the analysis on 2016, assuming that the distribution of consumption across regions and income groups would be the same as in our data period (2004) (2005) (2006) in the absence of climate policy. The consumption data is combined with the average carbon contents of goods from Hassett et al. (2009) We use Haiku to model the electricity sector more accurately. The model solves for electricity market equilibria in 21 regions of the country that are mapped into the 11 regions we use for the distributional analysis. The electricity model accounts for price-sensitive demand, electricity transmission between regions, system operation for three seasons of the year (spring and fall are combined) and four times of day, and changes in demand and supply-side investment and retirement over a 25-year horizon (Paul et al. 2009 ). The Haiku model also captures differences in the regulatory environment across regions and allows us to model different behavioral assumptions corresponding to fixed and variable charges for residential, commercial, and industrial customers, as we explained in the introduction. Table 1 illustrates the electricity sector results for the 11 regions of the country that we model, with an indication of how we aggregate states into these regions. 10 The model calculates a national baseline emissions rate of 0.602 tons of CO 2 per megawatt-hour (MWh) for 2016 in the absence of any climate policy. In this example, the introduction of an emissions cap (and scenario characteristics that correspond to the "pessimistic case" described below) lead to an emissions allowance price of $20.86/metric ton CO 2 (mtCO 2 ) (2006 dollars). Emissions fall to 0.516 tons/MWh. Table 1 also reports the percentage change in electricity price on a regional basis and the percentage change in consumption that is expected to result from the introduction of the price on CO 2 emissions. The triangular area under the marginal cost curve up to the emissions target is the cost of resources used to achieve emission reductions. The rectangle represents the value of emissions allowances generated (number of allowances times price per allowance) by the trading program.
EIA's analysis of H.R. 2454 provides an estimate of the aggregate burden, i.e., these two areas shown on the graph, along with a breakdown of this burden among sectors. We treat the electricity sector separately, using the Haiku model to obtain changes in emissions due to the CO 2 price. All other sectors' reductions and costs are assumed to match EIA.
To distribute these estimated costs of climate policy to households, we use the own-price elasticities and baseline emissions intensities reported in Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls (2009) EIA. This approach also rests on the implicit assumption that producers pass all costs through to consumers and bear none of the costs themselves, which is approximately true in the short run, when demand is relatively inelastic and opportunities for turnover of capital are limited. As a result, our estimate of the consumer surplus loss outside the electricity sector for the average household matches EIA's estimate of abatement cost (including allowance cost).
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For electricity, we use the Haiku electricity market model in place of EIA's forecast for the sector. The Haiku model reports price changes that are somewhat different across regions and slightly lower on average than EIA. Using Haiku in place of the EIA electricity model preserves substantial detail with respect to regions and customer classes and allows for the various treatments of customer classes and allocation scenarios that we discuss below.
We use the cost estimate that is predicted by EIA outside the electricity sector and by Haiku within the electricity sector to estimate the total burden on households to achieve an emissions reduction target for 2016. EIA's 2016 emissions level provides our emissions target, and we hold it constant across scenarios. 13 Across regions and income groups, these effects are distributed according to the expenditure patterns revealed in the Haiku model and the CES data.
Description of H.R. 2454 Cap-and-Trade Program
Title III of H.R. 2454 sets an annual cap on greenhouse gas emissions covering approximately 85 percent of all emissions in the U.S. including, among many others, those from oil refineries, natural gas suppliers, electricity generators, and industries such as cement, paper, iron, steel, and chemicals. The cap becomes gradually more stringent over time. In 2012, the first year the law would go into effect, covered emissions are required to be 3 percent below 2005 levels; by 2020, 2030, and 2050, this figure rises to 17, 42, and 83 percent, respectively. The cap is met by allocating emissions allowances among the regulated entities; those allowances can 12 This exercise does not materially affect our distributional findings. It does, however, provide estimates of houehold burden that have meaning in the policy debate and can be compared to estimates by others of the costs to households of cap-and-trade policy. 13 Both the EIA and Haiku models solve for aggregate intertemporal emissions targets and an intertemporal equilibrium that include potential changes in banking and the purchase of offsets. The models vary to a small degree with respect to emissions obtained in 2016. To hold constant the emissions in that year, we scale the results across scenarios. This introduces a small inconsistency in the aggregate intertemporal emissions reductions achieved over the modeling horizon, but that does not affect the distributional issues that are our focus in this paper. then be traded. The bill has approximately 22 separate provisions dealing with allowance allocation. Table 2 shows the breakdown for 2016, the year of our analysis.
We have divided the provisions into categories. A significant percentage of total emissions allowances is to go toward relieving the burden of higher energy prices on households.
Thus, both electricity and natural gas LDCs receive allowances. For electricity LDCs, which receive 30 percent of total allowances, distribution is based one-half on emissions and one-half on electricity output. Natural gas LDCs receive 9 percent of allowances. LDCs are regulated or publicly owned entities in all 50 states, so they can be expected to act as trustees on behalf of consumers, passing the value of allowances on to customers through lower rates (or equivalently funding investments) rather than retaining it as profits. How exactly they will do this is the subject of much debate and we return to this issue below. Other allocations are designed for a variety of purposes -to reduce the burden on low-income households, to provide money for adaptation to climate change, to fund supplemental international reductions, to lessen the burden on industries that are thought to be particularly hard hit by climate policy, and to enhance energy efficiency, technology development, and the development of renewable energy.
As the penultimate row of the table shows, the bill ignores an important expenditure. As carbon pricing raises the price of energy and all energy-using goods and services in the economy, the impact is felt not just by producers and consumers in the private market but also by government. Federal, state, and local government account for approximately 14 percent of all CO 2 emissions in the U.S. (CBO 2009b ), yet H.R. 2454 does not explicitly set aside allowances to cover those emissions. 14 We return to this issue and explain how we handle it in the next section of the paper.
14 Bills introduced in the U.S. Senate that have an impact on the federal budget are required to specify how that impact will be addressed, thus S. 1733 and 2877 both explicitly provide for increased government costs, though they do so imprecisely and do not account for changes in state and local costs. No such requirement exists in the House. How money will be spent is unclear in many cases. For example, money flows into several funds, such as the Natural Resource Climate Change Adaptation Fund, but no guidance is provided on how those funds are to be spent. The same problem exists for many of the energy efficiency, renewables, and technology development programs. Much of the money is allocated to state administered programs, but with no strict requirements as to how the funds are spent.
Even in those provisions that contain more specifics, outcomes and impacts on households are still highly uncertain. The LDC provisions are a case in point. Because they are regulated, LDCs are required to pass on the allowance value to consumers, but it is not obvious exactly how they will do that. H.R. 2454 has language suggesting that LDCs reduce fixed charges on monthly electricity bills for residential and commercial class customers "to the maximum extent feasible," but such a change is thought to be infeasible in practice and the more likely outcome is a reduction in variable electricity rates (Burtraw 2009 ). The outcome has serious implications for the cost of the policy. If variable rates are reduced, electricity consumption remains higher than it would be if the price of electricity reflected the price of CO 2 allowances used in generation. Consequently, other sectors of the economy must work harder to reduce emissions in order to meet the economy-wide cap. This increases the allowance price and the overall cost of the program (Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2009) . How households are affected, on net, is unclear, but we expect on average that households are made worse off for the effort to subsidize their electricity consumption. On the one hand, electricity prices are lower as are electricity expenditures. On the other hand, a higher allowance price results in increased prices for expenditures on goods and services other than electricity. Because the overall value of allowances is greater, how these allowances flow into various categories will also affect the outcome.
The energy efficiency, renewables, and technology development provisions also generate highly uncertain outcomes. Some observers and efficiency advocates have argued that a great deal of "low-hanging fruit" is available for reducing energy use and CO 2 emissions. In fact, an iconic image of the last decade, in energy policy circles, is the McKinsey efficiency curve that indicates substantial opportunities to reduce energy use at no cost or significant negative cost (McKinsey and Company 2007) . That study and several replicas, for example Sweeney and Weyant (2008) , identify marginal abatement cost curves for reducing CO 2 emissions. These curves show engineering cost estimates for achieving the same or a comparable level of energy services through a variety of energy-saving options in production and consumption. From an economic perspective, the technical costs of energy-saving options only address half the problem. There may be significant behavioral, informational or social barriers to realizing these potential technical gains. In any case, the ultimate impact of these provisions on energy use, emissions, and household welfare are unclear; allocating money to energy efficiency programs, technology development, renewable energy, and the like may improve upon private market outcomes or it might simply lead to wasted expenditures.
Modeling Strategy
To illustrate the range of potential impacts on the overall costs of the policy and the distribution of those costs across households, we model two bookend scenarios with respect to the LDC and energy efficiency provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill. One scenario is optimistic and the other pessimistic, distinguished by the possibility that uncertain provisions of the bill lead to efficiency-enhancing outcomes or not.
With respect to the LDC allocations, in the pessimistic scenario, we assume the allowance value flows to all classes of customers-residential, commercial, and industrial-via a reduction in the variable electricity rates on monthly bills. As we explained above, consumption is higher as a consequence of the subsidy to electricity prices, so the allowance price is higher in this case and the overall costs of the policy are higher as a result; this is the sense in which the assumption is pessimistic. In the optimistic scenario, we assume that fixed charges are reduced for industrial and commercial customers. However, we assume this remains infeasible for residential customers. As explained in Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz (2009) , a review of current billing practices and state public utility commission behavior suggests that significant hurdles exist to implementing this kind of pricing (a reduction in the fixed portion of the electricity bill)
by 2016. One prominent reason for this is that in almost no case does the fixed portion of costs appear as a separate line item on bills for residential class customers, and even when it does appear separately, the cost is recovered almost entirely through volumetric charges. Furthermore, even if it were possible to return allowance value to residential customers through fixed payments it is unclear how residential customers would respond. Many observers have suggested that residential customers are unlikely to understand and respond in an economically rational way to an increase in the variable rate (marginal cost) by reducing consumption if their overall bill were reduced. 15 Industrial and commercial electricity consumers, however, may have a more sophisticated understanding of the difference between the fixed and variable parts of their bill, and thus we evaluate this possibility in our optimistic case with respect to the allocation to LDCs.
Another of the significant sources of uncertainty affecting the future development of energy and climate policy is the ability to harvest potential low cost opportunities for 15 Borenstein (2009) illustrates that models of consumer response that have been used in many previous studies of increasing-block pricing are not realistic models of the information consumers have at the time they make consumption decisions.
improvements in the way producers and consumers use energy. Indeed, how well previous investments of this nature have performed remains controversial (Arimura, Newell, and Palmer 2009 ). The Waxman-Markey bill would expand the previous programs to a national scale, and how well this approach would perform in the future in regions that have no experience with such programs is even more uncertain. These so-called "opportunity regions" may have substantial undeveloped potential, but they also lack the infrastructure, expertise and regulatory rules such as decoupling of cost recovery from energy sales that have developed over many years in other regions. In addition, these regions historically have lacked the will (perhaps because of historically low prices) to implement such programs. On the other hand, intuition and some evidence indicate that the greatest efficiency improvements at the least cost may be technically possible in these regions. Arimura, Newell, and Palmer (2009) speculate that incremental spending by utilities that had low previous levels of spending could achieve savings at one-half the incremental cost of previous programs.
In the case of allowance value directed to energy efficiency and technology development, our optimistic scenario uses selective estimates in the literature for the cost of reducing electricity consumption through end-use efficiency improvements. We based the optimistic scenario on the premise that these options would not be adopted in response to the price signal Compared to other estimates of the cost of emissions reductions and our estimated allowance prices, the cost per ton for reductions that could be achieved through energy efficiency are relatively expensive. However, these investments not only reduce emissions but they also reduce spending on electricity, providing a direct savings and, thus, an additional benefit to households. We also capture this impact in the model. Based on findings in these studies, we assume in the optimistic case that CCS, renewable energy, and clean vehicle technology provide CO 2 emissions reductions at costs of $50/ton, $34/ton, and $75/ton, respectively. 17 In the pessimistic scenario, we assume that these activities and investments have no benefit and thus all of the allowance value devoted to them is lost.
Using these estimates along with the percentages devoted to these activities as specified in the bill, we calculate the total amount of money available, and then compute total emissions 16 For comparison, EIA (2009b) indicates average emissions intensity in 2010 is 0.000558 tons CO 2 per kWh. 17 We do not solve with any specific introduction date for any of the technology development provisions, and they may not be deployed by 2016. Instead, we assumed that some of these technologies will work to reduce cumulative emissions targets over the lifetime of the cap-and-trade policy, and consequently 2016 allowance prices, through the banking mechanism.
reductions. This means that fewer reductions are needed elsewhere in the economy, thus lowering the allowance price and providing a benefit to households. The pessimistic scenario simply assumes that the money going to all of the efficiency and technology provisions is lost. Table 3 summarizes the assumptions that we use in our two scenarios for the WaxmanMarkey bill. About 57 percent of allowances are allocated in the same way across the two scenarios; these are shown in the bottom portion of the table. The first four rows of that section show allocations that are captured in EIA's marginal abatement cost curve and that are taken into account in both the optimistic and pessimistic representation of H.R. 2454. 18 The provision dealing with low-income consumers is for households with annual incomes less than 150 percent of the poverty line. The EIA is directed to estimate loss in purchasing power for this group, and to refund it via direct cash transfers. We assume the allocations to refineries and to merchant (independently owned, unregulated) coal generation plants do not affect the variable costs of production, and hence are earned as industry profits that flow back to shareholders. Assigning the value of the domestic adaptation provisions to households is difficult. This money goes to dedicated trust funds; the money from those funds is to be spent on programs that offset the impacts of climate change. For lack of a better alternative, we simply distribute this money back to households as a lump-sum payment per person. Finally, we assume that all of the value of allowances going to international efforts -adaptation, forestry, and clean technology development -is lost to the U.S. economy.
The remaining allowances, or 43 percent of the total, are examined under the alternative optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. These allowances go to electricity LDCs and the variety of energy efficiency and technology development provisions discussed above.
We emphasize that the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, particularly in the case of the energy efficiency and technology provisions, are truly bookends, i.e., they reflect the range of plausible outcomes and the truth may lie somewhere in between. Nonetheless, they provide a sense of the uncertainty in the outcomes with such a large and complex climate bill. 18 This includes 3.75 percent of allocation directed to LDCs and home heating that EIA models explicitly as investments in energy efficiency. This is incorporated in the EIA marginal cost curves, and is held constant across our scenarios. Allocation to natural gas LDCs and home heating also is captured in the EIA model and is constant across our scenarios. For a third and final comparison, we model the impacts of a cap-and-trade program with 100 percent auction of allowances, with 75 percent of the revenue returned as a lump-sum per capita payment, i.e., a cap-and-dividend program. This formulation roughly corresponds to the Cantwell-Collins proposal (S. 2877), which reserves 25 percent of allowance value for a set of unspecified spending priorities. To model this, we assume that the funds that are not returned as dividends include money directed to lowering consumer costs for home heating from natural gas and fuel oil (6.75 percent) and expenditures on related energy efficiency programs and building codes (4.25 percent). In addition, we assume the maintenance of allowance cost rebates to energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries (14.44 percent). These priorities are embodied in the marginal cost curves we adopt from the EIA.
Finally, across all three scenarios we maintain the assumption that government incurs additional costs for its own direct expenditures on energy and other goods and services that are equal to 14 percent of allowance value. 19 It is not known if governments would meet these costs through tax increases or spending decreases, so the incidence of the costs is uncertain. Previous studies have frequently omitted this change in government cost, thereby implicitly introducing a tax that is hidden from their analyses, which will be paid ultimately by households. CBO (2009b) does not account for this cost directly, but nets it out against the 18 percent of allowances to government for spending on projects such as renewable energy and energy efficiency, and thus does not distribute to households these increases in government costs and spending. EPA (2009) predicts that increased prices of goods and services will increase government spending and assumes the increase is made up by adjusting taxes in a lump-sum manner. EIA (2009) analysis of H.R. 2454 does not specify if government costs increase under the policy, or if so, how the NEMS model accounts for the increased costs.
To account for the effect this has on household well being, we assume an increase in government costs equal to 14 percent of allowance value. Although the share is constant across scenarios, the absolute value of government's change in costs differs with the allowance price.
We assume budget neutrality in this regard, as does EPA, but we assume this is achieved through an increase in the average personal income tax for each income group. The increase in personal income taxes is accounted for in calculating the net change in consumer surplus per household. Table 4 shows the average consumer surplus loss by income quintile and for all households for the three scenarios: the two H.R. 2454 scenarios and the 75 percent cap-and- 
Results

Household
Impacts on Average Households
The average consumer surplus loss varies widely across the three scenarios, from $136/household in the optimistic H.R. 2454 scenario to $420/household in the pessimistic scenario, with the cap-and-dividend option in between, at $206/household. There are a number of factors driving the differences. We focus first on the comparison of our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.
Three categories of assumptions distinguish the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios: the assumptions about how LDCs will pass on the value of allowances to customers, in fixed or variable charges, and the assumptions about whether the value of allowances devoted to energy efficiency and technology programs yield benefits or are simply wasted resources. Separating the effects of these three policies on the difference between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios is not straightforward. Each policy affects the allowance price, which in turn has a direct effect on household expenditures and on the revenue that flows to the other program areas. For example, a change in the LDC allocation from optimistic to pessimistic scenario causes the allowance price to increase, making more allowance revenue available as compensation for lowincome families and for both technology and energy efficiency programs. To understand the effects of these three policies we use the Shapley value, which is an axiomatic approach to sharing of costs or benefits (Roth 1988 and pessimistic scenarios, resulting in a unique estimate of the share of that difference that can be attributed to each policy. Table 5 shows the results for the pessimistic and optimistic cases, along with the Shapley values that describe the percent of the reduction in cost and allowance price that can be attributed to each of the policies. The changes in the average cost and allowance value due to the LDC billing behavior are minimal. This is because the difference between the pessimistic and optimistic LDC assumptions is not as extreme as it is for the other two assumptions. Changing from pessimistic to optimistic assumptions for LDCs is a reallocation from one method of spending the revenue to a more efficient one. For the other two programs, the switch from pessimistic to optimistic constitutes a shift from an unproductive loss of the revenue to productive investments that benefit households.
Although the pessimistic LDC assumptions do have real costs and efficiency losses for households, they only account for 7 percent of the loss in household burden on average.
The savings to households due to changes in LDC assumptions are dwarfed by those of the electricity energy efficiency program, which accounts for 69 percent of the cost savings. 20 Efficiency policies provide savings through two separate mechanisms. Because of improved efficiency, households purchase less electricity than they would otherwise, and the lower quantity of consumption leads to a lower equilibrium price in electricity markets that further benefits households. In addition, emissions decline because less electricity is generated, meaning that other sectors of the economy do not need to reduce emissions as much; this lowers the allowance price and reduces overall costs. Although the payoff from electricity efficiency initiatives can be, and often is, sharply debated, we feel that the technology development initiatives in H.R. 2454 may be even more speculative. Over 8 percent of allowances are directed to CCS, clean vehicle technology, and renewable energy, and in our optimistic scenario, we assume these three investments provide 21 The government benefits from the electricity energy efficiency programs in the same way that households realize savings from decreased utility bills. The energy efficiency programs reduce the revenue collected by the government to pay for their increased energy costs under cap-and-trade. The electricity energy efficiency programs save households $16/year in increased tax revenue in the optimistic case.
CO2 abatement at $50, $75 and $34 per ton respectively. These costs are greater than the value attained for emissions reductions in other components of the model, so they raise program costs at least in the near term (2016). Nonetheless, in the optimistic scenario they provide a total reduction in emissions of 127 million tons. This lessens the burden on other sectors and lowers the allowance price compared to the pessimistic scenario. We hasten to point out that because of their relatively high abatement costs, these initiatives do not lower the allowance price in comparison with an alternative where the money would be returned to households directly or spent on more cost-effective CO2 reduction options.
Even considering the high abatement costs of the technology programs, they account for 51 percent, or $5.23, of the reduction in the allowance price between the pessimistic and optimistic cases. This large decrease is responsible for 25 percent of the savings ($71 per household). While these savings are significant, it is important to note that they are much smaller than those of the electricity energy efficiency program, although technology programs receive 8.1 percent of allowance value, compared to only 5.3 percent dedicated to the efficiency program.
As shown in Table 3 , all of the revenue directed at energy efficiency and abatement programs is assumed to be lost in the pessimistic scenario. This money constitutes 13.44 percent of allowance value, approximately $17.4 billion ($134/household) of revenue, which does not find its way back to households. Households would experience a decreased burden of $286 if this money were rebated directly, and they experience even greater savings as it is spent on energy efficiency and direct abatement programs. The cap-and-dividend case does not share the complexities of the H.R. 2454 scenarios and is hence much easier to understand. There is no uncertainty as to the potential effectiveness of energy efficiency and technology development programs or the outcomes of electricity LDC allocations.22 Instead, 75 percent of auction revenue is directed as a per capita dividend back to households that, as a result, experience a modest burden of $206 per year (last column of Table 4 ). The allowance price in this scenario is $17.37-substantially lower than in the pessimistic H.R. 2454 case but higher than in the optimistic case. 22 As in the optimistic and pessimistic Waxman-Markey cases, a small portion of allowance value directed to energy efficiency programs, as well as to subsidize home heating and to support trade-exposed industries is built into EIA modeling of the policy. Concequently, the outcome from these measures does not vary across our scenarios. In the cap-and-dividend case, this constitutes the 25.44 percent of allowance value that is not returned as dividends to households.
One reason the price and the consumer surplus loss are lower than in the pessimistic case is because of the 7 percent of allowance value going overseas to adaptation and supplemental reduction purposes in H.R. 2454 but not in the cap-and-dividend case. If this program were included in the cap-and-dividend scenario, directing a comparable 7 percent share of allowance value overseas, it would raise the average cost per household from $206 to $258. Furthermore, in the cap-and-dividend case, there is no cost from LDC allocations; but even in our optimistic scenario, we assume that LDC allocation leads to lower electricity prices for residential households, which increases the cost of the policy. However, most importantly, the uncertainty is eliminated. The wide range in our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios costs is a result of the uncertainty in how the LDC allocation will be implemented, as well as how the energy efficiency and technology provisions will work in practice, an uncertainty that does not exist with cap-anddividend.
Distributional Consequences Across Income Groups
In addition to differences for average households, our scenarios also reveal potential differences by income quintiles. However, the overall distributional consequence appears of secondary importance, compared to the overall changes in the level of the policy, which are reflected in the cost for the average household. The outcomes are reported in Table 4 .
The H.R. 2454 optimistic scenario exhibits comparatively low costs for most income quintiles compared to the other scenarios, which is driven by the low allowance price and electricity savings due to energy efficiency programs. In the optimistic H.R. 2454 scenario, we assume that LDCs are able to pass the allowance value through the fixed portion of electricity bills for commercial and industrial customers; in the pessimistic scenario, the value ends up reducing variable electricity prices. These differences have significant distributional consequences. In the optimistic case, the transfer ultimately finds its way to shareholders, the vast majority of which belong to the top income quintile. In the pessimistic case, commercial and industrial customers pass through the reduced electricity price to lower prices of goods and services; this benefits all consumers. Consumption is less concentrated in the upper income quintiles than is the share of ownership, which explains the fact that the average household in the fourth quintile bears a higher burden than the average household in the top quintile, in the optimistic scenario.
This effect can be seen in the Shapley values in Table 5 . The fifth income quintile sees significant benefits from the optimistic LDC assumption due to transfers to shareholders. The bottom four income quintiles, however, lose out because they do not receive the LDC subsidy through their goods prices or through an increase in shareholder value. 23 The extreme loss of 325 percent of the first income quintile is driven by the fact that low-income households receive 15 percent of total allowance value in both the optimistic and pessimistic cases. Consequently, as allowance price and total revenue increase, so does the amount of money directed to low-income households. The higher allowance price in the pessimistic case does increase the initial welfare loss of low-income households, however this is more than offset by the additional revenue directed toward them.
This effect can also be seen with the implementation of the technology programs. The 51 percent decrease in allowance price significantly reduces the amount of money flowing to lowincome households. This results in a 222 percent ($40) loss in consumer surplus to first quintile households. All other quintiles benefit from this policy due to the decreased initial consumer surplus losses of the lower allowance price.
The energy efficiency provisions in the optimistic case provide savings to electricity consumers based on their electricity consumption. Electricity usage typically increases with income, resulting in a higher cost savings for high-income households. As shown in Table 6 , households in the lowest income quintile save only $64 per year from the electricity energy efficiency programs in comparison with $127 per year for households in the top income quintile.
However, while high-income households may receive more absolute savings, savings to lowerincome households from energy efficiency are a larger share of their overall savings under the optimistic scenario. This is evident in the Shapley values, which attribute 447, 262, 88, and 72 percent of the household savings in the optimistic case to electricity energy efficiency programs for the first through fourth income quintiles, respectively. In addition, these savings are a larger share of their income than are the savings that accrue to the top income quintile. These results show how effective is the electricity energy efficiency program compared to the other two policies, and demonstrates its progressive nature. Costs as a percent of income for the top four income groups are higher in the pessimistic Waxman-Markey scenario, with the lowest quintile seeing larger net gains than in the optimistic case. This is largely due to the higher allowance value in the pessimistic scenario, which leads to more money available for transfers from high to low-income households.
Higher allowance prices also necessitate more money for government to cover its costs.
Because the money to cover government is assumed to come from personal income taxes, higher income households bear the burden of this increase in government spending. In the pessimistic case, $435 of the fifth quintile's $1,060 cost consists of increased income taxes. In contrast, the first income quintile only sees an average tax increase of $6/year to pay for government costs.
The distributional outcome of the cap-and-dividend case is much simpler than the other two cases because the vast majority of revenue is rebated as a per capita dividend. The distribution is strongly progressive, with the lowest income quintile coming out positive (although less so than under the Waxman-Markey scenarios that provide allowance value directly back to low-income households) and each subsequent quintile shouldering a larger burden as a percent of their income. The distributional outcomes of the cap-and-dividend case also are much more predictable than those of the Waxman-Markey cases.
Conclusion
Climate change poses an extraordinarily challenging coordination problem for the international community and for the domestic body politic. This difficulty is exacerbated because the science of climate change, the underlying characterization of opportunities to reduce emissions, and the prospects for technological change are all extremely uncertain. Although the uncertainty about effects and outcomes may be seen by the scientific community as the motivation for the implementation of policy to reduce emissions, the same sources of uncertainty have emerged among critics as fundamental reasons to object to climate policy in political debate.
We abstract away from these uncertain characteristics of the problem entirely. This paper focuses not on scientific or economic uncertainty, and only partially on technological uncertainty. Instead, we focus on a new source of uncertainty that is introduced in the design and implementation of policy intended to address this challenge. Specifically, we focus narrowly on uncertainty about the level and distribution of the burden on households that result from the Waxman-Markey formula for the allocation of emissions allowances. Even with this narrow focus, we find uncertainty about the implementation of the program and its costs on households to be substantial. The finding that policy design may exacerbate the fundamental characteristic that makes climate policy such a daunting challenge in the first place may be important to making progress on the policy debate.
We examine the allocation under H.R. 2454 under bookend scenarios that we label optimistic and pessimistic. In the scenarios, we explore the possible outcome with respect to three sets of issues. The first two scenarios explore the effect of allocations to electricity LDCs (30 percent of allowances) and the effect of allocations to promote efficiency (5.3 percent) and energy technology (8.14 percent). The remaining allowance allocations are held constant across the scenarios, including small additional allocations to efficiency and energy technology (0.5 percent). In the optimistic scenario, we assume that the allocation to LDCs introduces relatively minimal distortions away from efficient pricing of electricity, although distortions remain important for the residential class of customers, and we assume favorable outcomes with respect to expenditures on efficiency and technology development. The pessimistic scenario has contrary assumptions; in fact, in the pessimistic case, we assume that efficiency and technology investments are wasted. For comparison, we consider a third scenario that directs 75 percent of allowance value directly back to households, keeping the remaining 25 percent directed to some of the categories that are held constant in the other two scenarios.
Although the assumptions underlying our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are bookends, they highlight the wide range of potential outcomes under a complex allocation scheme such as espoused in current climate bills, and they represent assessments that are commonly found as part of the contemporary political debate. We find that if investments in electricity energy efficiency programs and technology development pay off, and if, for industrial and commercial class customers, allocations to electricity LDCs do not dampen the rise in There are important questions about and limitations to our analysis, but we conclude by drawing attention to just two. One important limitation is the use of partial equilibrium modeling for what is fundamentally a general equilibrium problem. The partial equilibrium approach allows us greater flexibility in manipulating institutional representation in the model, but important feedbacks within the economy are lost to the analysis including, for example, the hidden costs associated with introducing new regulatory costs to the economy. A second limitation is the actual schedule of opportunities for energy efficiency and technological innovation. Under each of our scenarios that assume optimistic or pessimistic outcomes, we assume a constant return to scale for these endeavors. In fact, efficiency or technology could exhibit increasing cost, but through learning by doing and other factors, it could alternatively exhibit decreasing costs. Moreover, the examination of these technological possibilities on a piecewise basis rather than in an integrated technological model introduces the opportunity for double counting of emissions reductions opportunities. While concerns about returns to scale arguably introduce bias in any direction, the possibility for double counting is likely to bias our cost estimates downward. In any event, this illustrates one more way in which the cost of climate policy to households is uncertain.
